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INTRODUCTION

The new revision to the Illinois criminal sexual assault statute'
attempts to give an answer to the often asked question among jurors in

1. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-17 (2002), amended by Act of July 25, 2003, P.A.
93-389, § 5.
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criminal sexual assault cases: "Once penetration has occurred with the
female's consent, if the female changes her mind does force from that point
'2
(where she changes her mind) constitute rape?" Several courts in various
jurisdictions have been presented with this question during trials and
appeals of convictions for rape and criminal sexual assault. Those courts
that have granted review of cases involving this issue have handed down
polarized opinions. A major split among circuits has resulted over the past
several decades on the issue of what has been termed as "post-penetration
rape.",3 The post-penetration rape issue is the most recent in a long history
of issues which have arisen from rape cases. Other issues have included
the definition of force, the validity of marital rape and acquaintance rape,
4
varying degrees of rape, and rape shield statutes, among others.
This comment stands for the proposition that, due to the perpetual
confusion among jurors at trial and courts that try cases involving postpenetration rape, the state legislatures are in the best position to clarify
individual state stances on post-penetration rape as a viable rape with the
Illinois criminal sexual assault statute serving as a model for this
recognition. Additionally, for those state legislatures that choose to adopt a
stance on post-penetration rape as a viable rape, this comment discusses the
various options legislatures can use to address this issue and create clarity
among jurors and courts. Finally, this comment addresses problems of
proof that could attach when a legislature chooses to recognize postpenetration rape as a rape, and possible solutions to those potential proof
problems so that legislatures will not be discouraged from enacting postpenetration rape laws.
Part I of this comment dissects the recent California Supreme Court
case, In re John Z., 5 upon which the amendment to the Illinois criminal
sexual assault statute is based. It will examine the two lines of cases that
6
served as precedent in the California courts, and the holding of John Z.:
the recent judicial stance that favors upholding post-penetration rape as a
7
rape and points out the flaws in the Vela line of reasoning. Finally, Part I

People v. Vela, 218 Cal. Rptr. 161, 162 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (although this
2.
jury posed the question in terms of a female victim, the Illinois statute is gender-neutral).
Amy McClellan, Comment, Post-PenetrationRape-Increasingthe Penalty, 31
3.
SANTA CLARA L. REv. 779, 780 (1991).
In re John Z., 60 P.3d 183, 188 (Cal. 2003).
4.
In re John Z., 60 P.3d 183 (Cal. 2003).
5.
See People v. Vela, 218 Cal. Rptr. 161 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985); People v.
6.
Roundtree, 91 Cal. Rptr. 921 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).
In re John Z., 60 P.3d at 185.
7.
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examines a recent case in the
Kansas Court of Appeals, the first court to
8
apply the decision in John Z
Part II examines the extent of the impact of the decision from In re
John Z. on the legislative revisions to the Illinois criminal code. 9 It will
examine the precise amendment to the statute in the wake of John Z. as an
exception to the defense of consent ° and also offer alternative means of
incorporating the John Z. holding into legislation, including the option to
have varying degrees of rape" or to make lack of consent an element of
rape.' 2 This comment will also touch on the potential pro and con
arguments regarding the new Illinois revisions, list the safeguards for
defendants against false accusations, and argue that legislatures are in the
best position to clarify the elements of rape as well as the exceptions to
affirmative defenses.
Finally, Part III explores the ramifications of a state's decision to
recognize post-penetration rape as a rape. This includes a commentary on
the viable use of direct victim testimony as well as Rape Trauma Syndrome
testimony by expert witnesses as viable evidence of post-penetration rape, 13
the interaction between post-penetration rape statutes and rape shield
statutes, as well as the emerging use of sexual consent forms to avoid
accusations of rape in both criminal and civil cases in light of the rape case
against basketball star Kobe Bryant.14
I.

POST-PENETRATION RAPE IN THE JUDICIARY: IN RE JOHN Z.AND
SUBSEQUENT CASE LAW

In January of 2003, the California Supreme Court handed down a
decision, In re John Z.:15 the first instance in which a state supreme court
officially recognized post-penetration rape as a form of rape. The court
attempted to resolve the question of "whether the crime of forcible rape is
committed if the female victim consents to an initial penetration by her
male companion, and then withdraws her consent during an act of

8.

9.

State v. Bunyard, 75 P.3d 750 (Kan. Ct. App. 2003).

720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-17 (2002), amended by Act of July 25, 2003, P.A.

93-389, § 5.
10.
Id.
11.
McClellan, supra note 3, at 805.
12.
Parks v. State, 526 S.E.2d 893, at 895 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999).
13.
14.

Id.
Ava Cadell, Kobe Bryant and Sex Consent Form, available at

15.

InreJohnZ.,60P.3dat 184.

http://www.avacadell.com/ava/articles/a992.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2004).
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intercourse, but the male continues against her will.' 6 This situation has
been termed as post-penetration rape because it applies only to the limited
situation where penetration has been initially consented to and then the
consent is withdrawn, yet the penetration is continued against the will of
the victim.' 7 The case settled a long-term dispute over the viability of postpenetration rape as a punishable rape between two different appellate
18
After the
courts in California, yet still left some questions unanswered.
decision in In re John Z., other states have adopted California's logic,
either in their case law jurisprudence' 9 or in amending prior criminal
re John Z 20
statutes to reflect an acknowledgement of the decision in In
A.

BACKGROUND OF POST-PENETRATION RAPE

Amy McClellan, as a student at Santa Clara Law School, was the first
known author to coin the term "post-penetration rape.",2' She used the term
to describe the legally significant phenomenon of a female who initially
consents to intercourse with the defendant and then later during the
intercourse, for whatever reason, makes it known to the defendant that she2
to cease.
has changed her mind and that she wants the intercourse
McClellan argued that such conditions required an increase from their then
23
recognition as a mere assault or battery to a full-fledged crime of rape.
McClellan summarized the changes in recent history to rape laws to include
marital rape and acquaintance rape and argued that post-penetration rape
was the next potential change in the area of rape law.24
Until 2003, post-penetration rape had never been acknowledged
specifically within state criminal statutes. Illinois was the first state to
amend its criminal code to reflect the changing perception of postpenetration rape as a special subsection of acquaintance rape. 25 However,

In re John Z., 60 P.3d at 184 (citation omitted).
16.
McClellan, supra note 3, at 780.
17.
People v. Vela, 218 Cal. Rptr. 161 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985); People v. Roundtree,
18.
77 91 Cal. Rptr. 921 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).
See State v. Bunyard, 75 P.3d 750 (Kan. Ct. App. 2003).
19.
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-17 (2002) (amended by Act of July 25, 2003, P.A.
20.
93-389, §5).
McClellan, supra note 3, at 780.
21.
Id.
22.
Id. at 780-81.
23.
McClellan, supra note 3, at 781-82.
24.
Dave McKinney, Clarification of Rape Law Signed Quietly by Governor;
25.
Blagojevich Also Oks Non-PrescriptionSale of Syringes, CHI. SUN TIMES, July 29, 2003, at
6.
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courts have debated about post-penetration rape for the past three decades.
In general, these debates were among appellate courts after the defendant
appealed following a rape conviction, disagreeing with the jury instructions
given at his trial that recognized 26that the victim had the right to change her
mind after giving initial consent.
B.

FACTS

In re John Z. was the first state supreme court case which faced the
issue of post-penetration rape head-on. 27 The facts of the case are fairly
straightforward. On March 23, 2000, Laura T., a seventeen-year-old
female, went to a party at the residence of the defendant, John Z., after
picking up Juan G.28 Upon arrival at John Z.'s house, John Z. and Juan G.
drank beer, although Laura T. did not. 29 Later that evening, Juan and Laura
went into a bedroom and Juan told Laura he wanted to have sex with her,
and Laura said that she was not ready for sex.
Juan became upset, so
John and another party guest asked Laura why she "wouldn't do stuff," and
3
she told them that she wasn't ready. 1
Laura was ready to leave the party when the defendant, John Z., asked
her to talk with him in his bedroom whereupon he told Laura that Juan
didn't care for her and then he asked her to be his girlfriend instead.32 Juan
then entered the bedroom and John left to make a phone call.3 3 Upon
John's return, he and Juan asked Laura if she fantasized about having a
"threesome" with two guys. 34 The two boys began to fondle Laura and she
did not object until Juan removed his pants and put on a condom. 35 The
defendant left the room, and Juan got on top of Laura and although she
resisted and told him she did not want to have sexual intercourse, he was
too strong and forcibly penetrated her, only stopping after the condom fell
off due to her resistance.36 Laura told Juan that the condom falling off was
a "sign that they shouldn't be doing this," and Juan said fine and left the

26.
1067 (Me.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

See Battle v. State, 414 A.2d 1266 (Md. 1980); State v. Robinson, 496 A.2d
1985).
SeelnreJohnZ.,60P.3dat 183.
Id. at 184.
Id.
In re John Z., 60 P.3d at 184.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
In re John Z., 60 P.3d at 185.
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Juan was originally a co-defendant with John Z. for his conduct,
but ended up admitting to amended charges of sexual battery and unlawful
sexual intercourse.38
After this incident with Juan, Laura rolled over and tried to find her
clothes in the dark room, upon which John Z. entered after having removed
his own clothes. 39 Laura did not say anything, and John rolled Laura over
so that she was pushed back onto the bed and began kissing her and
complimenting her body, and she kissed him back. n° John Z. then got on
top of her, penetrated her, and rolled her over so that she was on top of
him. 41 Laura testified she "kept ... pulling up, trying to sit up and get it
out... [and John] grabbed my hips and pushed me back down and rolled
me over so I was on my back . . . and ... kept saying, 'will you be my
girlfriend.' ' 42 Laura kept trying to pull away and said that if John really
cared about her, he wouldn't be doing this and that he should respect her
wishes.43 Laura repeatedly told the defendant that she needed to go home,
but he kept asking her to just give him a minute and Laura said, "No, I need
to go home." 44
On cross-examination, Laura said that John did not stop, "[h]e just
45
stayed inside of me and kept like basically forcing it on me." About a
minute to a minute-and-a-half later, John got off of her, helped her get
dressed and find her keys, and she left. 6 The defendant claimed the sex
was consensual as a defense, saying that he stopped as soon as Laura said
she had to go home.47 John Z. was subsequently convicted of forcible rape
in a juvenile proceeding in a California Superior Court and appealed his
conviction.4 8 The court of appeals affirmed this conviction, and the
California Supreme Court granted certiorari.4
room. 37

37.
38.
39.

Id.
Id.
Id.

42.
43.
44.

Id.
Id.
/d.

40.
41.

45.

46.
47.
48.
49.

In re John Z., 60 P.3d at 185.
Id.

Id.

Inre John Z., 60 P.3d at 185.

Id.

Id. at 183.
Id.
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C.
THE COURT'S ANALYSIS AND HOLDING: VELA OVERTURNED AND
ROUNDTREE UPHELD

Although the California Supreme Court found that Laura's initial
consent to intercourse with John Z. was "hardly conclusive," it assumed,
arguendo, that Laura impliedly consented, or at least refrained from
objection, to the initial penetration.5 ° The court went on to question the
logic of the appellate court in People v. Vela, a 1985 California Fifth
District Appellate Court case that dealt with the issue of post-penetration
rape. 5' Finally, the court upheld the line of reasoning used in the court
below and in the precedent of People v. Roundtree, a case from a different
California court of appeals.5 2
In Vela, the issue of post-penetration rape was a question of first
impression in California at that time.53 The factual situation involved a
nineteen-year-old defendant and a fourteen-year-old victim. 54 In his
statement to the police, the defendant admitted that the victim, Miss M.,
initially consented to an act of sexual intercourse with defendant, Vela, and
during the act she changed her mind and made the defendant aware that she
had withdrawn her consent.5 5 Thereafter, the jury at trial determined that
the defendant, without interruption of penetration, continued the act of
sexual intercourse against the will of Miss M. by means of force.56 The
Fifth District Court of Appeals looked to the existing "scant authority from
other jurisdictions" to decide the case and determined that post-penetration
rape was not a rape.57 Using cases from Maryland 58 and North Carolina,59
the Vela court determined that the outrage of the victim due to the violation
of her womanhood was the essence of the crime of rape 60 and that consent
at the moment of initial penetration was the crucial point of a rape, so there
was less chance of outrage if the victim initially consented to the
intercourse and then changed her mind.6 '

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

In re John Z., 60 P.3d at 185.
See People v. Vela, 218 Cal. Rptr. 161 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
See People v. Roundtree, 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d 921 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).
Vela, 172 Cal.App.3d at 241.
Id. at 239.
Id. at 240.
Id.
Id.
See Battle v. State, 414 A.2d 1266 (Md. 1980).
See State v. Way, 254 S.E.2d 760 (N.C. 1979).
Vela, 218 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 163.
Id. at 162.
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The California Supreme Court disagreed with the logic used by the
court in Vela.62 The court determined that the outrage suffered by victims
of post-penetration rape would be substantial.63 Even so, the court declared
that outrage by the victim is not an element of rape, although it may be one
reason for punishing the crime, albeit an archaic purpose. 64 The California
District Court of Appeal
Supreme Court adopted the logic of both the Third
66
below 65 and the First District Court of Appeal.
Fourteen years after Vela in People v. Roundtree, California's First
District Court of Appeal came to the opposite conclusion of the Vela court,
holding that "[tihe crime of rape . . . is necessarily committed when a
victim withdraws her consent during an act of sexual intercourse but is
forced to complete the act.", 67 Roundtree involved a thirty-nine-year-old
defendant and a fifteen-year-old victim. 68 The defendant, Roundtree,
testified that Jennifer, the victim, consented to intercourse with him and
that at one point she asked him to stop because she thought she heard
someone coming near the car they were in. 69 At that point, he claimed that
Jennifer became angry and he got off of her.7°
The Roundtree court found the logic of the Vela court unsound for the
same reasons the California Supreme Court did. 7' The First District Court
of Appeal used several out-of-state cases to support its decision, all of
which concluded that post-penetration rape was a viable rape.72 Instead of
following the logic of the Vela court, the Roundtree court followed a Maine
case, State v. Robinson, which held that "[t]he dramatic change from the
role of a voluntary participant to that of a victim compelled involuntarily to
submit to the sexual intercourse is a distinct one. 73 When a victim is
forced to submit to continued intercourse for a period after she has revoked
her original consent, the crime of rape is committed.74 The California

62.
In re John Z., 60 P.3d 183, 186 (Cal. 2003).
Id.
63.
64. Id.
65.
See In re John Z., 60 P.3d 183 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
66. See People v. Roundtree, 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d 921 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).
67.
Id. at 924.
68.
Id. at 922.
69.
Id. at 923
70.
Id. at 922.
In re John Z., 60 P.3d 183, 186 (Cal. 2003). For a discussion of these reasons,
71.
see infra p. 155 and note 62.
See McGill v. State, 18 P.3d 77, 84 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001); State v. Siering,
72.
644 A.2d 958, 963 (Conn. 1994); Robinson, 496 A.2d at 1071; State v. Crims, 540 N.W.2d
860, 865 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995); State v. Jones, 521 N.W.2d 662, 672 (S.D. 1994).
Robinson, 496 A.2d 1071.
73.
Roundtree, 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 924.
74.
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Supreme Court agreed with the First District Court of Appeal, adopting its
holding in Roundtree and rejecting that of the Fifth District Court of
Appeals in Vela.75
The California Supreme Court proceeded to articulate two general
elements that properly invalidate initial consent and convert initiallyconsented-to intercourse into a rape.7 6 First, after the victim changes her
mind following initial consent to intercourse, she must clearly
communicate the withdrawn consent to the defendant, who thereafter
ignores it, and no reasonable person in the defendant's position would have
believed that the victim continued to consent, which is an objective
standard of belief.77 Second, after consent has been withdrawn, the
defendant continues the intercourse with force substantially greater than
that necessary to accomplish the rape itself.78 The court applied these
elements to the case against John Z., finding that the first element was
satisfied by Laura's repeated statements to John asking him to stop and
saying she needed to go home. 79 The court found that no reasonable person
in John's position would have mistaken this for consent. The second
element was satisfied through Laura's testimony that John "stayed inside of
[her] and kept like basically forcing it on [her].",80 The court determined
that this description8 of force met the forcible continuance requirement of
the second element. 1
Finally, the court rejected the defendant's "primal urge" defense in
which he argued that he should have had a reasonable amount of time in
which to cease penetration based on the fact that males have primal
instincts that do not allow them to cease intercourse immediately upon
being asked to do so. 82 83The court found no basis for this defense within
California's rape statute.

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

In re John Z., 60 P.3d at 186.
Id. at 186-87.
Id.
InreJohnZ.,60P.3dat 187.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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THE LONE DISSENTER, JUSTICE BROWN

Justice Brown gave the sole dissenting opinion in In re John Z.84 He
concurred in the ultimate holding that post-penetration rape is a viable
expansion of acquaintance rape; however, he disagreed with the majority
because they ignored critical questions of proof in the case. 85 He disagreed
with the majority that Laura's statements that she had to go home
amounted to a clear communication of her withdrawn consent and argued
that the State did not prove both elements beyond a reasonable doubt: a
lack of John's reasonable and honest belief in continued consent and his
use of force.86 First, Justice Brown felt that Laura's "silent and ineffectual
movements could easily be misinterpreted ... as requests for reassurances
or demands for speed., 87 Laura herself acknowledged that she "never
officially told" the defendant that she did not want to have sex. 88 Second,
Justice Brown questioned the presence of force, saying that John simply
requested more time without demanding it or threatening consequences. 89
Justice Brown also raised the issue of "he said, she said" types of
testimony that are prevalent in rape cases. 90 He felt that the trial judge in
91
this case completely ignored John's testimony in favor of Laura's.
Finally, Justice Brown raised the issue of the majority's reliance on the fact
that John did not immediately cease the penetration; however, the majority
did not clarify how soon would have been soon enough for him to desist or
whether persistence is the equivalent of force.92 This raises issues of
problems of proof as well as the legislative responsibility to set standards
for post-penetration rape elements, which this comment will address, infra.
E.

IN THE WAKE OF JOHNZ.: KANSAS FOLLOWS SUIT

Seven months after the California Supreme Court handed down In re
John Z., Kansas incorporated California's decision into its own
jurisprudence in State v. Bunyard.93 A case with a similar factual scenario

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Inre John Z., 60 P.3d at 188 (Brown, J., dissenting).
Id.
Inre John Z., 60 P.3d at 188 (Brown, J., dissenting).
Id.at 190.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 188.
Id. at 190.
In re John Z., 60 P.3d at 190 (Brown, J., dissenting).
State v. Bunyard, 75 P.3d 750 (Kan. Ct. App. 2003).
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as John Z., Bunyard stands for the proposition that post-penetration rape is
viable in Kansas as a rape, and because Bunyard was a jury trial rather than
a juvenile proceeding like John Z, the Kansas Court of Appeals had to face
the issue of confusion among jurors in post-penetration rape cases and gave
some 94guidance to the lower courts on how jury instructions should be
given.

Bunyard involved a twenty-one-year-old defendant and three rape
victims, one of which, E.N., was seventeen. 95 While in the defendant's car
with him, E.N. did not inform Bunyard that she did not wish to have sexual
intercourse until a few seconds after he had penetrated her, whereupon she
said, "I don't want to do this. Please don't make me do this. ' 96 The
defendant did not stop and said, "Just a little bit longer., 97 E.N. again
stated that she did not want to have intercourse, but Bunyard did not
cease. 98 She then attempted to sit up and roll over but could not, 99and so
she began to cry and told Bunyard that she didn't want to get hurt and
asked him not to do that to her.1° Bunyard did not stop for an additional
five to ten minutes after she told him to stop. l0' The defendant then
stopped the penetration and asked E.N. to perform oral sex on him, which
she refused, and then they both dressed and left the car. 10 2 The district
court found Bunyard guilty of rape and Bunyard appealed his conviction to
the Kansas Court of Appeals. 10 3 Bunyard testified that the entire encounter
was consensual and that E.N. stopped the intercourse once
Bunyard told
4
her that he was not interested in a relationship with her."1
The Kansas rape statute defines rape as "(1) Sexual intercourse with a
person who does not consent to the sexual intercourse, under any of the
following circumstances: (A) When the victim is overcome by force or fear
... "
This is an example of a statute where non-consent is an
affirmative element of the crime of rape rather than an exception to an
affirmative defense of rape as it is in Illinois. The Kansas Court of Appeals
examined other states' approaches to post-penetration rape since it was a

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id.
Id. at 754.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Bunyard, 75 P.3d at 754.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 754-55.
Bunyard, 75 P.3d at 755.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3502 (2002) (amended 1996).
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matter of first impression in Kansas. 0 6 It first rejected the Vela line of
cases and then applied the John Z. theory of post-penetration rape and
expanded upon it. 107 The Kansas court explained that intercourse does not
end once penetration is achieved and that intercourse is simply the amount
of contact needed for a rape to have occurred. 0 8 It agreed with California
that a participant may withdraw consent after initial penetration, and if the
penetration is continued thereafter by force or fear, a rape has been
committed. 09
The defendant brought up the same "reasonable time" argument that
John Z. argued in California, and the court found that five to ten minutes of
continued intercourse after the victim has communicated a withdrawal of
her consent was not a reasonable time. 10 The Kansas Court picked up
where the California court left off and actually acknowledged that a
"reasonable time" argument is viable in some instances, whereas California
would not allow this argument and only answered it in a hypothetical sense.
However, the Kansas court never gave an example of what a reasonable
time would be.
The Kansas Court of Appeals went on to address the issue of jury
instructions at the trial when the jury asked, "If someone allows
penetration, but then says no and he does not stop, does that fit the legal
definition of rape? Please elaborate on the law, if there is any [to] elaborate
[on].""' The trial court simply referred the jury to the rape statute and said
it could not elaborate further."12 Bunyard argued that the trial court's
instructions did not adequately answer the jury's question." 13 The Kansas
Court of Appeals said that since this was a matter of first impression, the
trial court had discretion on what instructions to give to the jury and that
the question was answered appropriately. 14 This ambiguity in addressing
the issue of jury instructions supports this comment's proposition that the
state legislature is best equipped to define post-penetration rape within its
criminal codes since the trial courts tend to simply defer to the statute when
answering juror questions on this topic.
The lone dissenter in Bunyard, Justice Johnson, argued that the joinder
of the rape charges against the three different victims violated Bunyard's

106.

Bunyard, 75 P.3d at 755-56.

108.
109.
110.

Id.
Id.

107.

111.
112.

113.
114.

Id. at 755-57.
Id. at 756.

Bunyard, 75 P.3d at 757.
Id.

Id.
Id.at 758.
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due process rights. However, Justice Johnson also stated that the other two
victims were unwilling participants from the beginning, whereas E.N. only
communicated her unwillingness to have intercourse after the moment of
initial penetration, and that trying these two types of rape together
"jumbles" the issues." 5 Further, Justice Johnson agreed with the majority's
holding that post-penetration rape is a rape." 6 In a new spin in support of
the recognition of post-penetration rape, Justice Johnson stated that rape, as
defined by Kansas, includes three elements: (1) sexual intercourse; (2)7
without consent; and (3) when the victim is overcome by force or fear."
He argued that it doesn't matter in what order the elements are satisfied as
long as all three are satisfied." 8 In a typical rape scenario, lack of consent
and presence of force or fear precede the initial penetration. However, in
post-penetration rape, they follow the initial penetration and Justice
Johnson argued that it is irrelevant at what point the elements are met as
long as a withdrawal of consent is communicated to the perpetrator." 9
Bunyard and John Z. represent the likely direction in future postpenetration rape cases will be decided. Both courts recognized that postpenetration rape is a rape, and this opens the door to a new class of victims
who find themselves in the situation of having granted initial consent to
intercourse but later, for whatever reason, changes her mind and
communicate this fact to their sexual partner who ignores her. Even the
dissent in Bunyard recognized post-penetration rape as a rape, albeit one
that is distinct from traditional rape based on timing. 20 In the past, such
victims have had little recourse when faced with this type of a violation
against her personal autonomy, and now have some recourse in the
criminal justice system. The main obstacle in post-penetration cases in the
future shall be problems of proof, which will be addressed, infra, in this
comment. However, because other states will still face the issue of postpenetration rape as a matter of first impression as Kansas recently did,
legislatures are well-advised to follow the example of Illinois and
incorporate post-penetration rape standards into their criminal code rather
than perpetuate the confusion among jurors and courts.
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II. POST-PENETRATION RAPE IN THE LEGISLATURE: THE ILLINOIS
STATUTE AND ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF AND AGAINST RECOGNITION OF
POST-PENETRATION RAPE AS A RAPE

Six months after In re John Z. was handed down, the decision was
applied by the Illinois State Legislature to its criminal code. In Illinois, the
State Legislature unanimously passed an amendment to its criminal sexual
assault code recognizing withdrawn consent as an invalidation of the
The amended law is
consent defense to criminal sexual assault.'12
acknowledged as being the first of its kind among the states.' 22 This postJohn Z. action by Illinois gives greater clarification to the elements of postpenetration rape. The fact that Kansas and many other states had to deal
with juror confusion and that Illinois was able to incorporate postpenetration rape as an exception to the defense of consent indicates that the
state legislatures are in the best position to clarify the description of postpenetration rape in state statutes rather than having the courts act as
legislatures in creating post-penetration rape as a new rape.
A.

THE AMENDED ILLINOIS CRIMINAL SEXUAL ASSAULT STATUTE

In July of 2003, the Illinois State Legislature unanimously approved,
and the governor signed into law, an amendment to its criminal sexual
assault statute that reads as follows:
A person who initially consents to sexual penetration or
sexual conduct is not deemed to have consented to any
sexual penetration or sexual conduct that occurs after he or
she withdraws consent during23the course of that sexual
penetration or sexual conduct.1
The operative effect of this amendment was to incorporate the
decision of the California Supreme Court in In re John Z. into Illinois law
as an exception to the defense of consent in criminal sexual assault cases.
Illinois Senator Dan Rutherford, the legislator who introduced the
amendment, explained that he did not wish for Illinois to go through the
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same lengthy litigation battles as California did, and so the most direct way
to deal with the issue of consent was to clarify it directly in the criminal
sexual assault statute. 24 Rutherford stated that, so far, Illinois has not had
to deal with the issue of post-penetration rape in a judicial proceeding as
California and Kansas both have, and that the clarification that the
amendment brings will avoid lengthy litigation in the Illinois courts,
25 since
Illinois law now makes it clear that post-penetration rape is a rape.1
B.

JUROR CONFUSION IN POST-PENETRATION RAPE CASES AND THE

LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION

Although Illinois is attempting to avoid lengthy litigation that debates
the validity of post-penetration rape, several other states which do not have
similar legislation have had to deal with this issue, and some courts have
chosen not to decide on the issue at all, even when it presents itself in a
case. Most states have sided with California's stance on post-penetration
rape, but some states have gone the other way and found that a revocation
of consent does not transform continued, forcible penetration into rape, and
other states have chosen to avoid the issue entirely. Because of this split
among states and within states, the state legislatures are in the best position
to clarify their positions on post-penetration rape, as Illinois has.
Besides California and Kansas, other states have had to deal with jury
confusion when a defendant is indicted after a victim initially consented to
sex and then revoked that consent only to have the defendant forcibly
continue the intercourse. Appeals tend to be brought in these cases based
upon a judge giving flawed instructions to the jury on whether it is rape
when this situation occurs.
In Maine, the jury in State v. Robinson asked the trial judge whether it
was rape if two people consent to a sexual act and then one person says no
and the other continues. 126 The judge responded that the victim having to
continue the intercourse under compulsion constituted rape. 27 Maine's
Supreme Judicial Court emphasized that the act did not become rape just
because the prosecutrix revoked consent, but because the intercourse was
continued by the use of force, explaining that post-penetration rape is not
met merely by the absence of consent. 128 This is one example of a state

124.

Dan Rutherford, "No" Means "No" in Illinois, at

http://www.danrutherford.com/PressReleases/030403release.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2004).
125.
Id.
126.
Robinson, 496 A.2d at 1069.
127.
Id.
128.
Id.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 25

coming to a different conclusion than California due to the ambiguity in its
criminal laws.
In Alaska, the jury in McGill v. State asked the judge whether if, while
engaged in sexual penetration, one party says 'stop,' consent terminates at
that point.129 The judge answered that consent to initial penetration could
be withdrawn, but all elements of first-degree rape must be proven beyond
a reasonable doubt. 30 On appeal, the Alaska Court of Appeals held that
such an instruction was not plain error since the defendant had not properly
preserved an objection for appeal. 1 The fact that the defendant had not
researched this issue ended up hurting him when he raised the issue on
appeal, since the court of appeals found that the trial judge did not commit
a plain error as there was room for reasonable attorneys and judges to
debate on the issue of post-penetration rape. 132 The fact that there is room
for debate on such an important issue weighs in favor of clarification by the
Alaskan Legislature of the criminality of post-penetration rape rather than
leaving it to the discretion of trial judges.
In Minnesota, the jury in State v. Crims asked whether it is rape under
the law if someone says no during the act of sexual intercourse and the
other person continues the act after the former tells them to stop. 33 The
appellate court found that Minnesota's rape statute was broad enough to
include the requirement of consent to intercourse beyond the initial
penetration so that forcible continuance of initially-consented-to
intercourse was included in Minnesota's definition of rape. 134 The court
drew a parallel between post-penetration rape and rape of a physically
helpless victim and said that the trial judge's refusal to instruct that rape is
impossible after initial consent is given was not plain error. 13 Instead of
having to draw parallels to other recognized instances of rape, the
Minnesota courts would have an easier time enforcing post-penetration
rape as a rape if the Minnesota legislature clarified its third-degree rape
statute to include post-penetration rape as a separate offense from the rape
of a physically helpless victim.
In South Dakota, the defendant in State v. Jones appealed after the
trial judge refused to give his proposed instructions to the jury that an act of
intercourse is not rape when the "female initially consents to the act, but
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after penetration, withdraws her consent, and the male, without interruption
of penetration, continues the act against the will of the female and by
means of force."'136 The Supreme Court of South Dakota held that rape
prosecutions were not foreclosed just because initial consent was given and
refused to adopt Vela. 137 In this instance, the defendant would have
received a better explanation as to why his instruction was not adopted if
South Dakota had incorporated this explanation into its second-degree rape
statute and recognized that initial consent did not foreclose prosecutions for
rape.
In New Mexico, the jury in State v. Crain asked whether continuing
sex after a woman says no after a sex act begins is rape. 138 In chambers
with counsel, the trial judge responded to the query by saying: "The way I
propose to answer the question is that, 'I'm sorry. I cannot answer that
139
question. You'll have to rely on the instructions and the evidence."" 40
Neither party objected to this instruction and it was given to the jury.

The court of appeals found that this refusal to grant further instruction was
not a fundamental error because a failure to define a term in an element is
not a failure to give the elements of a crime.' 4' The fact that the trial judge
could not answer the jury's question is proof that the New Mexico
legislature had not adequately addressed the issue of post-penetration rape
in its criminal laws and that a definition of post-penetration rape should be
incorporated into the law to avoid future juror confusion and inadequate
answers by the trial judge.
The fact that so many juries in so many different states have
repeatedly asked the same question, requesting trial judges to clarify
whether revoked consent followed by continued forcible intercourse
constitutes rape, indicates that state legislatures need to clarify the answer
to this question rather than leaving it up to trial judges to answer. The trial
judges currently have too much discretion to answer this question, and
sometimes choose not to answer it at all to completely avoid this issue.
Rather than having such confusion perpetuate through costly and
lengthy litigation, the state legislatures should use the Illinois statute as an
example and clarify whether post-penetration rape should exist as a
punishable rape offense within the state. The repetitious nature of the postpenetration rape jury question, along with inconsistent answers to it by trial

136.

State v. Jones, 521 N.W.2d 662, 672 (S.D. 1994).

138.
139.
140.
141.

State v. Crain, 946 P.2d 1095, 1098 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997).
Id.
Id.
Id.

137.

Id.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 25

judges, is evidence that the current legislation concerning rape in most
states is facially unclear with respect to the matter of post-penetration rape.
This must be dealt with by the legislatures in order to prevent future
confusion. Illinois was the first state that recognized this quandary: the
Illinois legislature dealt with it simply and straightforwardly by
unanimously passing an amendment to its rape laws in order to avoid
lengthy and costly court cases to resolve the matter.
C.
ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF AND AGAINST POST-PENETRATION RAPE AS
A RAPE AND LEGISLATIVE OPTIONS FOR RECOGNITION

After the new Illinois amendment made national headlines as the first
law of its kind, opinions began to emerge that brought out the reasons for
and against recognizing post-penetration rape as a crime punishable as a
rape. As the states weigh these pro and con arguments for incorporating
post-penetration rape into their respective criminal codes, they should also
be made aware that there is more than one way to incorporate the crime,
should they elect to do so.
Several justifications for the recognition of post-penetration rape have
been put forth by various rape victims' rights groups, courts, and
legislators, as well as by the public at large. One major argument in favor
of recognizing post-penetration rape is that victims of post-penetration rape
should have some recourse in the criminal justice system, other than a
charge of simple assault or battery, when forced to continue intercourse
after revoking consent to it. Because the major distinction between postpenetration rape and traditional non-initially-consented-to rape is simply a
matter of timing, and all elements of rape are still met in post-penetration
rape cases, the argument is that victims of post-penetration
rape should
142
have the same recourse as traditional rape victims.
Another argument in favor of full recognition of post-penetration rape
as a rape is the opinion that the non-recognition of post penetration rape as
a rape is based on archaic stereotypes. 143 This argument purports that the
Vela line of reasoning, which states that a woman's outrage when she is the
victim of post-penetration rape is not of the same magnitude as that of a
traditional rape victim, is based on archaic and incorrect stereotypes about
women and rape that are unrealistic.144
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Since the California Supreme Court has articulated that outrage is not
an element of rape, 45 another argument in favor of the recognition of postpenetration rape as a rape is that post-penetration rape is a violation of
individual autonomy in sexual choice just as traditional rape is. The reason
that non-consent is an element of or an exception to a defense of rape is
that consent allows for personal autonomy in sexual decision-making, so
that non-consent to a sexual act is a violation of a person's ability to make a
choice about whether or not to engage in sexual activity. 146 As the dissent
in Bunyard stated, it does not matter in which order the elements of rape
are presented as long as they are all met. 147 The rationale for this argument
is that the victim is deprived of his or her right to choose to end sexual
activity for whatever reason, including painful intercourse, lack of birth
control and fear of pregnancy, guilt from having an affair, fear of getting
caught by a parent, fear of contracting a sexually transmitted disease, etc.
The fact that the other partner continues the intercourse after the victim has
expressed his or her will to stop is a violation of his or her personal
autonomy to decide whether to engage in sexual relations or not.
Finally, the argument can be made that post-penetration rape should
be recognized as a rape because the consequences for the victims are
similar, if not identical, to those suffered by victims of traditional rape.
Victims of post-penetration rape have been shown to suffer both physical
and mental consequences from the crime against them. For example, in
Bunyard, the victim, E.N., exhibited abrasions in her genital area after she
was the victim of a post-penetration rape, although such abrasions could be
consistent with those in consensual intercourse. 48 Even more common
consequences of a post-penetration rape are emotional and mental
anguish. 49 Victims of post-penetration rape often suffer similar symptoms
as victims of traditional initially-non-consensual rape, known in the
medical profession as Rape Trauma Syndrome (RTS). 5 ° Such symptoms
of RTS include reliving the rape, an inability to maintain previously close
relationships, and a general sense of nervousness known as "the startle
response."' 15 1 Because the consequences of post-penetration rape and
traditional rape are similar, if not identical, post-penetration rape should be
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recognized as a rape rather than a different crime such as an assault or
battery, or as non-criminal conduct.
On the other side of the spectrum, those who are against the
recognition of post-penetration rape as a rape utilize several arguments.
The first argument, articulated in the Vela case, is that the outrage of a
victim of post-penetration rape is not of the same magnitude as the outrage
suffered by a victim of traditional rape who never granted consent. 152 The
Supreme Court of California dispelled this argument as being too archaic
and found that there is no adequate way to measure outrage and that the
53
outrage suffered by post-penetration rape victims must be substantial.
Based on the decision in In re John Z., the Vela outrage argument is not
likely to hold much weight in future post-penetration rape cases.
Next, those who oppose post-penetration rape being acknowledged as
a rape may point to the increased difficulty in proving the occurrence of
post-penetration rape and the problems for defendants in such cases. They
cite the lack of physical evidence and conflicting testimony of the victim
154
and the alleged perpetrator as being unfairly prejudicial to the defendant.
However, this argument is unlikely to hold much weight in the future due
to the availability of Rape Trauma Syndrome as proof of the occurrence of
Additionally, the burden will be on the
post-penetration rape. 55
prosecution to prove that the revocation of consent was communicated to
the defendant and that he or she forcibly continued the intercourse against
the victim's will. This burden of proof on the prosecution to prove all
elements of post-penetration rape beyond a reasonable doubt gives an
appropriate safeguard to post-penetration rape defendants against false
accusations and lack of proof just as it would in a traditional rape
indictment.
Finally, those who oppose the recognition of post-penetration rape as
rape state that the standards for post-penetration rape are as of now unclear:
that defendants who commit post-penetration rape are controlled by a
primal male urge to copulate and that they should be allowed a reasonable
time to cease the intercourse once asked to by the victim. 156 The argument
states that due to the lack of clarity in the current laws, a defendant would
not know when he or she is violating the law by continuing intercourse for
too long after consent is revoked. However, this argument can be refuted
by future clarification of the reasonable time standards, as the Bunyard
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court attempted when it said five to ten minutes was beyond a reasonable
time. 57 Although the Court did not give an exact time limit for cessation
of intercourse, a "reasonable person" objective standard is not uncommon
in criminal law and allows courts flexibility rather than having to determine
whether the individual defendants believe that they ceased in a reasonable
time. This is one area in which courts should have discretion to interpret
legislation once the state legislatures begin to adopt post-penetration rape
as a legitimate rape crime.
Some would argue that post-penetration rape is non-criminal conduct
rather than rape or a different crime such as an assault or battery. This
stance is inherently flawed because even courts that have refused to
recognize post-penetration rape situations as rape, such as the Vela Court,
58
still uphold convictions for such situations as a battery or an assault.
Additionally, the fact that continuing intercourse beyond the point where
initially-given consent is revoked is a violation of a victim's personal and
sexual autonomy, demonstrates that it should be considered a rape rather
than some other offense. This is because the non-consensual penetration
involved, which is different from mere sexual touching, is an element of
1 59
sexual assault or battery.
Once a state reconciles the two opposing viewpoints on postpenetration rape and chooses to incorporate post-penetration rape into its
rape statute, that state's legislature has three basic options for
incorporation. First, the legislature can make non-consent an element of
rape and clarify non-consent as including initial consent that is revoked,
with the revocation of said consent communicated to the perpetrator.
Second, the state can make the communication of revoked consent an
exception to the affirmative defense to rape of consent. Finally, the state
has the option to make post penetration rape a separate rape offense from
traditional rape with its own defined elements.
In the first instance, the courts have generally been left to their own
devices to broadly interpret statutory definitions of non-consent to include
clearly communicated revoked consent in addition to an absence of initial
consent, as they have in California.16 A legislative amendment which
specifically enumerates non-consent as including a clearly-communicated
revocation of initially-granted consent would clarify whether or not courts
would be permitted to make this broad interpretation of non-consent in
states like California. The state will need to prove beyond a reasonable
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doubt that the revocation of consent was clearly communicated to the
accused, making the continued intercourse non-consensual.
Secondly, state legislatures which use the presence of consent as an
affirmative defense to rape rather than the absence of consent as an element
of rape have the option to make the clear communication of revoked
consent an exception to the affirmative defense of consent. Illinois is an
example of a model for other state legislatures to follow should they choose
to use this option in clarifying post-penetration rape.' 6' Illinois explains
through its amendment that revoked consent is not consent as defined under
the defenses to rape. 62 The defense of consent is raised by the accused to
rebut evidence of force presented by the state.163 When the accused raises
the consent defense, the state has both the burden of proof on the element
of force as well as on the issue of consent and will, therefore, still need to
prove the communication of revoked consent beyond a reasonable doubt.
Finally, the state legislatures have the option of making postpenetration rape a completely separate criminal offense from traditional
rape, yet still recognizing it as rape. This is probably the best means of
clarifying to the courts what the elements of post-penetration rape are,
since they may be specifically articulated in a separate statute. This can
include elements to be proven by the state, punishments, defenses, and
in
exceptions, if any. This idea of a separate statute is illustrated
64
McClellan's article, where she drafts a model statute of this type.1
Regardless of which of these three options the state legislature
chooses, the state may, for reasons of public policy, choose to ameliorate
the harshness of a post-penetration rape conviction by creating in its
criminal code different degrees of rape. This is similar to the way murder
is often categorized into varying degrees. Such lesser degrees of rape are
currently in use by states such as Washington in order to differentiate
between crimes such as marital rape or unarmed acquaintance rape as
compared to a non-acquaintance, armed rape (which would constitute firstdegree rape). 165
No matter which option a state legislature chooses to incorporate postpenetration rape into its criminal codes through, the burden remains on the
prosecution to prove all elements of rape beyond a reasonable doubt. This
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acts as a constitutional safeguard for the accused. The incorporation of
post-penetration rape into state legislation does not take away too much
power from the courts. The courts can still act as a check on the legislature
by retaining the ability to determine factors such as what a reasonable time
for cessation of the intercourse would be after consent is withdrawn, what it
means to clearly communicate revocation of consent, which instructions
will be given to the jury, what constitutes forcibly continuing intercourse
after consent has been revoked, and the types of evidence to admit at a trial.
Such judgments will be largely fact-based, and trial judges are bestequipped to make such determinations on how to interpret and apply the
new laws to various situations.
IU.

PROBLEMS OF PROOF IN POST-PENETRATION RAPE CASES

Once a state makes the conscious decision to incorporate postpenetration rape laws into its existing criminal code and takes the necessary
steps to add such amendments or to draft separate laws recognizing this
situation, the courts will have a clearer archetype for dealing with postpenetration rape cases appearing on their dockets. However, even though
the elements of post-penetration rape will give a higher degree of clarity,
courts will still need to deal with issues of proof and evidence, which are
common in traditional rape cases and may even be magnified in postpenetration rape trials. Such problems of proof include conflicting
testimony between the victim and the accused, the interaction of the
recognition of post-penetration rape with existing rape shield statutes, the
use of Rape Trauma Syndrome (RTS) as evidence by the prosecution, and
the use of sexual consent forms as evidence of consent.
This section of the comment examines each of these four areas of
evidence and gives the likely rulings of courts on such evidence when it is
offered at trial. Even though post-penetration rape situations have been
litigated since the 1970s, there are few cases dealing directly with postpenetration rape as a crime of rape. Hence courts will have a lot of leeway
in deciding which evidence shall be admitted to prove that a postpenetration rape occurred beyond a reasonable doubt, or that consent
existed.
A.

"HE SAID, SHE SAID"

One possible concern among opponents of post-penetration rape
expansions would be the increase in "he said, she said" types of testimony
at trial. The fact that a victim of post-penetration rape can revoke consent,
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and the forcible continuance of intercourse after that point constitutes rape,
might increase the likelihood of false accusations of rape because the
victim can say that he or she revoked consent and clearly communicated
that to the accused, and that the accused did not stop within a reasonable
time. Even if this were untrue, it would be the victim's word against that of
the accused as to whether she revoked consent, clearly communicated that
revocation to the accused, and whether the accused did not stop within a
reasonable amount of time, a standard which is as of yet undefined by most
courts.
False accusations of rape harm both the accused and potential future
rape victims. The falsely-accused defendant faces harmed reputation and
the embarrassment of being an accused felon, and the credibility of future
legitimate rape victims will be harmed if false accusations are prevalent.
This concern about false accusations and conflicting testimony will be
alleviated by several judicial and legislative safeguards, as well as by the
admissibility of Rape Trauma Syndrome evidence.
First, it is important to recognize that false accusations occur in
traditional rape cases as well as post-penetration rape cases. However, in
post-penetration rape cases, evidence of physical trauma resulting from
initially-consented-to intercourse, which becomes rape upon clearlycommunicated revoked consent, is less likely to exist than in traditional
acquaintance rape cases in which no initial consentis given and the initial
penetration is forced. 166 This is one factor that is likely to weed out false
accusations since, other than the victim's testimony, the prosecution will
only have Rape Trauma Syndrome evidence to rely on in post-penetration
rape cases, whereas they can rely on physical trauma evidence in traditional
rape cases. This decrease in physical evidence will serve as a check on
false accusations of post-penetration rape.
Another important check on false accusations of rape is the criminal
prosecution of false accusers. Some states, including Michigan, allow for
criminal prosecutions of alleged victims who are later shown to have
falsely accused someone of rape. An example of a recent indictment of an
alleged victim for making a false accusation of rape is the case of Nicole
Milburn and her false accusation of rape against Scotty Anderson, a
professional football player for the Detroit Lions. 167 Milburn's friend had
consensual sex with Anderson, and afterwards, Milburn allegedly
attempted to impregnate herself with Anderson's semen from the used
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condom. 168 The prosecution, in the case against Milburn, said this was
done so that she could get pregnant, have a child support claim against
Anderson, and falsely accuse him of raping her. 169 In Michigan, the
prosecution said, making a false accusation of rape is a felony offense and
Milburn could face a four-year term of imprisonment if convicted. 7 ° The
fact that a false accuser could face serious criminal charges will act to deter
false accusations of both traditional rape and post-penetration rape.
However, this deterrent may also have a chilling effect on victims of postpenetration rape and deter them from coming forward with legitimate
accusations against perpetrators out of the fear that they will not be
believed and will instead be prosecuted for making a false accusation of
rape.
The prosecution typically has little, if any, access to physical evidence
in post-penetration rape cases, and people who make false accusations of
rape can face felony charges. These two facts serve as safeguards against
false accusations in post-penetration rape cases. It is unlikely that there
will be a greater number of false accusations in post-penetration rape cases
than there are currently in other types of rape cases because of these
checks. Therefore, legislators should not be reluctant to incorporate postpenetration rape into state legislation for fear of an increase in false
accusations. Yet, the fact that there is little physical trauma evidence does
not mean the prosecution is left to rely on the victim's testimony alone.
B.

RAPE TRAUMA SYNDROME (RTS)

By definition, victims in post-penetration rape cases initially granted
consent to sexual penetration and, at some point after that initial consent,
clearly communicated a revocation of that consent to the perpetrator who
forcibly continued the intercourse thereafter for an unreasonable time."'
Because of the physical mechanics of post-penetration rape, there will be
little physical trauma evidence such as vaginal cuts, scratches, and bruises
as compared to cases in which the initial penetration resulted from nonconsensual force, as in acquaintance rape or armed rape.172 Because of the
lack of evidence of physical trauma in post-penetration rape cases,
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prosecutors are resorting to the use of mental or emotional types of
evidence as proof that the rape occurred.
Rape Trauma Syndrome (RTS) will be the most important tool in the
prosecution's arsenal in post-penetration rape cases, aside from direct
victim testimony which inculpates the accused. RTS is a sub-category of
Post-Traumatic Stress Syndrome, which is a psychological disorder 173 most
commonly associated with soldiers who suffer mental anguish which
results from experiencing gruesome events in times of war. However, the
rape trauma subsection of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder suggests that
victims of sexual assault experience emotional consequences after the fact,
which include fear, anger, and anxiety, exhibited through such behavior as
crying, sobbing, and even smiling. 174 Another category of victims exhibits
a more controlled style of reaction to the rape in which feelings are masked
or hidden and a calm, composed, or subdued demeanor is exhibited.'7 5
Some rape victims suffer other symptoms of RTS which
177 include reliving
the rape 176 and the development of subsequent phobias.
Ideally, prosecutors in post-penetration rape cases would be able to
fully utilize RTS evidence at trial to prove that the victim has been raped.
Some states previously had rules of evidence which excluded RTS
evidence to prove the proposition that, because an alleged victim suffered
178
from symptoms consistent with RTS, the rape had in fact occurred.
However, increasing numbers of states are allowing RTS evidence in the
occurred. 179
form of qualified expert witness testimony to prove that a rape
For example, the Illinois criminal statute specifically allows for the use of
RTS evidence in cases of criminal sexual assault, including postpenetration rape cases.' 80 The Illinois statute has been clarified by recent
cases which specify the manner in which RTS evidence may properly be
used at trial. The main case in this area is an Illinois Supreme Court case
which states that RTS may be used in cases of acquaintance rape to prove

People v. Wheeler, 602 N.E.2d 826, 829 (Ill. 1992).
173.
Arthur H. Garrison, Rape Trauma Syndrome: A Review of Behavioral Science
174.
Theory and its Admissibility in Criminal Trials, 23 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 591, 596 (2000).
Id.
175.
Id. at 637.
176.
Id. at 598.
177.
McClellan, supra note 3, at 795.
178.
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-7.2 (2002) ("In a prosecution for an illegal sexual
179.
act perpetrated upon a victim, including but not limited to prosecutions for violations of
Sections 12-13 through 12-16 of the Criminal Code of 1961 . . . testimony by an expert,
qualified by the court relating to any recognized and accepted form of [P]ost-[T]raumatic
[S]tress [S]yndrome shall be admissible as evidence."). Id.
Id.
180.
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that a victim was, in fact, raped when it is introduced through an expert
witness, qualified by the court, who preferably has had the opportunity to
examine the victim.' 8' Once the door has been opened by the prosecution
through expert testimony regarding RTS, the defendant is entitled to rebut
this evidence with testimony about the victim's lack of RTS symptoms by
his or her own qualified expert witness who may examine the victim as
well, as long as a compelling reason for the examination is demonstrated. 182
Because Illinois has managed to incorporate the use of RTS evidence
into its criminal code to prove the likelihood that an individual was a victim
of post-penetration rape, there now exists a viable model for other states to
use in their own criminal legislation. The admissibility of RTS evidence
can easily be extended to apply not only to acquaintance rape, but also to
post-penetration rape since these victims will suffer symptoms of RTS
similar to those of traditional rape victims; both types of victims suffer the
violation of their personal autonomy and freedom to make sexual choices.
Because RTS is recognized statutorily and judicially as legitimate evidence
in acquaintance rape cases, RTS will, by extension, be a solid form of proof
in post-penetration rape cases in the future, and will help to alleviate the
fear of false accusations and "he said, she said" types of conflicting
testimony.
C.

INTERACTION WITH RAPE SHIELD STATUTES

The potential interaction between the incorporation of postpenetration rape into state criminal codes and state rape shield statutes is
worthy of closer discussion. In general, the incorporation of postpenetration rape into a state's criminal code has two main areas of
interaction with rape shield statutes. First, when post-penetration rape is
recognized as a rape, a victim is entitled to revoke initially-granted consent
to intercourse at any point after the initial penetration has occurred and the
forcible continuance of the penetration after this point becomes a rape. 83
With respect to rape shield laws, which allow the admission of evidence by

181.
People v. Wheeler, 602 N.E.2d 826, 832 (I11.1992).
182.
People v. Lopez, 800 N.E.2d 1211, 1224-25 (I11.2003) (compelling reasons for
having a defendant's expert witness examine the victim for RTS symptoms is a balancing
test of factors which include "age of the alleged victim; the remoteness in time of the
alleged criminal incident to the proposed examination; the degree of intrusiveness and
humiliation associated with the procedure; the potentially debilitating physical effects of
such an examination; the probative value of the examination to the issue before the court;
and the evidence already available for the defendant's use.").
183.
In re John Z., 60 P.3d 183, 186 (Cal. 2003).
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the defense in rape cases to prove prior instances of consensual intercourse
between the victim and the defendant in order to show consent to the
intercourse in question, 84 the rape shield law is inconsistent with postpenetration rape cases. There is little point for a defendant to introduce
evidence of past consensual intercourse between himself or herself and the
victim if the victim is enabled by the post-penetration rape laws to change
his or her mind and revoke initial consent to the intercourse in question
even after it has begun. Second, the rape shield statutes still remain valid
as protection for the defendant with respect to issues other than that of
consent in order to allow the defendant to impeach the victim-witness
based on motive. A victim-witness may still be impeached in postwhen they cross-examine him or her
penetration rape cases by the defense
185
rape.
of
accusations
false
past
on
Rape shield laws, in general, are designed to give protection to victims
of rape and encourage them to come forward and report rapes without fear
of embarrassment or harassment. 186 Such rape shield laws are an important
87
tool in acquaintance rape cases to protect the integrity of the victim.1 The
laws are the result of trial techniques by rape defendants in which things
such as prior sexual encounters between the victim and the accused were
brought up in court to show that the victim "deserved" to be raped or could
not have been raped because she previously consented to sex with the
defendant. 88 The Illinois rape shield laws are automatically applicable to
post-penetration rape cases because they are applied to all criminal sexual
rape by implication as
assault crimes, which now include post-penetration
89
an exception to the defense of consent.
The incorporation of post-penetration rape as a rape in criminal
statutes will have at least two different effects on existing rape shield laws.
First, one purpose of the post-penetration rape amendment in Illinois is to
open the door to victims to be able to press charges against the accused for
rape even if the accused and the victim have had prior sexual encounters.
Since the rape shield laws are designed in part to exclude evidence of prior
sexual encounters between a rape victim and the accused except where
defendants try to introduce the evidence to prove that the victim

184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
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725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-7(a) (2002).
People v. Davis, 787 N.E.2d 212, 218-20 (I11.App. Ct. 2003).
Id.
Id.
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consented,' 90 this portion of the rape shield statute may be incorrectly
applied in post-penetration rape cases since the victim is able to revoke
consent at any time for any reason after the initial intercourse has begun
under a post-penetration rape theory, so prior consent is irrelevant with
respect to the intercourse in question. Although the rape shield law
exceptions are somewhat inconsistent with post-penetration rape cases,
where prior sexual encounters are irrelevant, they are still valid in allowing
evidence of prior sexual encounters between the victim and the defendant
in traditional rape cases in which the defendant attempts to prove that
initial penetration was consensual based on the existence of consent for
prior sexual encounters.
Second, an Illinois Appellate Court' 9' has expanded the second clause
of the Illinois rape shield statute that allows evidence of the victim's prior
sexual activity or reputation when constitutionally required to be admitted
in rape cases. The Court said that under the second clause of the rape
shield statute, a defendant has the right, under the Confrontation Clause of
the United States Constitution, to cross-examine a victim-witness where
evidence of his or her "past sexual conduct is relevant and tends to
establish bias, motive, or prejudice."'' 92 In the case at bar, the Illinois Court
interpreted this to include cross-examination of past false accusations by
the victim against other men as acceptable under the rape shield statute
since it may establish a motive by the victim to lie in her accusation against
93
the present defendant. 1
This expansion of an exception to the rape shield statute in Illinois to
allow a defendant to cross-examine a victim about her prior false
accusations of rape serves as another safeguard for defendants in postpenetration rape cases. Those who oppose the inclusion of post-penetration
rape in rape statutes may cite an increase in false accusations as a reason
not to recognize post-penetration rape. However, the fact that a defendant
may cross-examine witnesses who have previously made false accusations
of rape, along with the recent enforcement of criminal charges against false
accusers and other safeguards, will serve as checks against the possibility
of false accusations. Because of these checks, the legislatures should not
be reluctant to incorporate post-penetration rape laws into their criminal
code out of fear of an increase in false accusations.
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Id. (example of typical state rape shield statute).
People v. Davis, 787 N.E.2d 212, 218-20 (111. App. Ct. 2003).
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-7(a) (2002) (amended 2003).
Davis, 787 N.E.2d at 218-20.
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SEXUAL CONSENT FORMS

The last area in terms of problems of proof in post-penetration rape
cases involves the use of sexual consent forms. A recent trend, particularly
by persons in Hollywood and in professional sports, is the use of sexual
consent forms as proof of consent. The remainder of this comment
discusses irrelevance of sexual consent forms in post-penetration rape
cases, which may be problematic for defendants.
194 is an
Dr. Ava Cadell, hailed as "America's leading sexologist,"
outspoken advocate of the use of sexual consent forms. On her website,
Dr. Cadell explains that in the wake of rape cases like that against
basketball star Kobe Bryant, celebrities, politicians, musicians, corporate
95 cannot be too careful regarding
figureheads, and professional athletes
96 Dr. Cadell's fear for such famous
their choice of sexual partners.
personas is that the "groupies" with whom they choose to have sex and
who grant consent for sex acts will change their stories, say the sex was
nonconsensual, and sue for civil damages and/or press criminal charges
against the innocent celebrity. 97 She says that celebrities should consider
using sexual consent forms with their sexual partners in order to avoid such
98
legal consequences should a partner lie about the sex being consensual.1
The general format of Dr. Cadell's proposed sexual consent form is
that of a standard form contract. The consent form has a blank line at the
top where the celebrity would ask his or her potential sex partner to fill in
his or her name.199 The form asks the sex partner to swear, under penalty
of perjury, that he or she is at least eighteen years of age, the age of legal
majority in most states, to avoid the celebrity having sex with a minor and
later being accused of statutory rape. z°

Guru,
Love
Cadell,
Ava
Dr.
Cadell,
Ava
194.
http://www.avacadell.com/ava/hollywoodtalk.html (last visited Oct 3, 2004).
195.

Bryant Case Triggers Dating Consent Form, at
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Ava Cadell, Dr. Ava Cadell, Love Guru, at
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Ava Cadell, Dr. Ava Cadell, Love Guru, at
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Ava Cadell, Dr.Ava Cadell, Love Guru, at
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http://www.nbc4.tv/sports12649497/detail.html(last visited Jan. 5, 2004) (news story about
sexual consent forms as they relate to professional athletes in the wake of the rape case
against basketball star Kobe Bryant).
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Id. (However, the irony is that such a clause is contradictory in itself, since
200.
minors are generally not bound to contracts).
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Next, the sexual consent form asks the sex partner to declare that he or
she is signing the consent form under his or her own free will and is not
being threatened, with harm or embarrassment, into signing the consent
form.
Both parties then agree that the form shall be kept private except
in the event of a subsequent accusation by the sex partner against the
celebrity of sexual misconduct. °2 Then, the sexual consent form has a list
of sexual acts which the sex partner is to initial if he or she agrees to
engage in any of them; they include "sexual fondling, petting, and kissing,".
"sexual intercourse," "oral copulation (mutual)," and "other., 20 3
Finally, the sexual consent form recommended by Dr. Cadell asks the
sexual partner to declare that he or she is not under the influence of drugs
or alcohol and that he or she agrees to engage in consensual sex with the
celebrity and not to change his or her mind before the sex act is over.2°
This last portion of the sexual consent conflicts with post-penetration rape.
Principles of post-penetration rape specify that the victim of postpenetration rape be allowed to withdraw initially-granted consent to
intercourse at any point after the intercourse has begun, and as long as he or
she clearly communicates this revocation to the defendant, who then
continues with the intercourse forcibly, the once-consensual sex is
transformed into rape.20 5 Therefore, even if the sexual partner signs a
sexual consent form granting written consent to specified sex acts, postpenetration rape principles allow him or her to change his or her mind at
any time after that initial consent. Hence the right to change one's mind
about sexual intercourse cannot be waived.
One reason that the right to change one's mind about sexual
intercourse cannot be waived is because of the purpose of criminal law as a
whole. Criminal charges for rape and other crimes are not brought by the
individual, as they would be in a civil case.20 6 They are brought either in
the name of the State, the Commonwealth, the People of the State or
Commonwealth, or the United States.20 7 Because a crime affects both the
individual victim as well as the People as a whole in terms of cost, future
harm, rehabilitation, etc., the individual victim does not have the right to
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208
Applying this philosophy, the sex
control the trial as in civil cases.
partner does not have the ability to waive his or her right to change his or
her mind about granting consent to a sex act because the rapist has harmed
more than just the individual victim: he or she has committed an offense
against society as a whole.
One example of this philosophy at work is in a rape case which
29
involved a woman, who was sleeping, being raped by her boyfriend. 0 The
victim asked that the defendant not be charged and minimized the rape to
the jury because of her love for him.210 In spite of this, the defendant was
convicted. 2" Therefore, in post-penetration rape cases, if it comes to light
that the victim revoked consent and the defendant forced him or her to
continue the sex act, even if he or she signed a sexual consent form, the
consent form will not be admitted into evidence in a criminal trial since it is
irrelevant whether initial consent was given or that the victim promised not
to change her mind as long as that consent was properly revoked. The only
potential for sexual consent forms to be used as evidence helpful to a rape
defendant would be either in traditional acquaintance rape cases in states
where post-penetration rape is not recognized as a rape, or possibly in civil
cases, where the courts are more lenient about waivers of the right to sue
212
under principles of forbearance.

CONCLUSION

Although post-penetration rape cases began to emerge on court
dockets almost three decades ago, the issues, problems, and benefits of
post-penetration rape laws are still matters of first impression in many
courts. Because these courts have avoided dealing with post-penetration
rape issues, and the courts that have tried to deal with them have often done
so with juries that are less than clear on the issues and definitions of rape,
the state legislatures need to follow the model that the Illinois General
Assembly has created in order to clarify post-penetration rape issues and
avoid lengthy, costly litigation.
As this comment has argued, several safeguards against an increase in
false accusations resulting from the recognition of post-penetration rape as
a rape exist, and are easily utilized to protect those falsely accused.
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for an explanation of forbearance and waiver of the right to sue in civil cases.
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Illinois, California, and Kansas have all recognized that an individual who
has had prior sexual encounters with a perpetrator and then revokes consent
to present intercourse with him or her after it has begun, only to be ignored
and forced to continue, should have recourse in the criminal justice system,
particularly when studies show that such victims suffer emotional
consequences similar to those of victims of traditional rape. Although
post-penetration rape may be more difficult to prove than traditional forms
of rape due to lack of physical evidence, there are methods of proof which
include direct victim testimony and Rape Trauma Syndrome testimony by
expert witnesses which can help show that all of the elements of postpenetration rape are met.
The recognition of post-penetration rape by legislatures and
interpreting courts as a rape rather than a simple assault or battery will send
the message to perpetrators that "yes" then "no" still means no, and that
initial consent is not a one-way ticket to completed intercourse when the
victim expressly changes his or her mind.
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